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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices can be addressed through a variety of means.
We propose that each device select its own addresses, we
motivate this choice, and we describe mechanisms for deliv-
ering data using these addresses.
Hierarchical point-of-attachment addresses are not effec-
tive with mobile devices. The network has to maintain a
global mapping between addresses and locations whether or
not the address is topological. Since this mapping is needed
anyway, there is not much point in having the structure of the
address encode device location. Instead, we have designed
a network protocol, AllNet, to support self-selected address-
ing. When data is transmitted over the Internet, a Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) provides a connection between senders
and and receivers.
The advantages of self-selected addresses include the abil-
ity of devices to join and form a network without any need
for prior agreement, and the ability to choose a personal,
memorable address. When multiple devices choose the same
address another mechanism, such as signed and encrypted
messages, provides the necessary disambiguation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ubiquitous communication cannot always be supported
by expanding the fixed infrastructure. For the foresee-
able future, there will always be areas that are not cov-
ered and people who cannot afford to pay for service.
Instead, mobile devices can themselves forward mes-
sages when there is no infrastructure to do so. Message
forwarding may be very limited, but still provide basic
communication infrastructure for emergencies and text
messages. When desired, message forwarding can be
extensive, with each mobile device essentially acting as
a wireless access point as part of a mesh network.
As long as the mobile device keeps track of its owner’s
social network, the degree of service provided can be de-
pendent on the owner’s social distance from the parties
in the communication. Specifically, each packet received
by a mobile device and intended to be forwarded is as-
signed a local priority based on a number of factors,
one of which is whether the sender or receiver can be
identified within the social network stored in the device.
This local priority determines how often the packet is
forwarded and how long it is stored locally. The lowest
level of service is designed to balance the selfish inter-
ests of the owner of the device by limiting the resources
used to about 1% of what the device provides, with the
community interest of providing a network that can be
used by anyone within range for at least basic text mes-
saging service.
Because messages are carried by mobile devices be-
longing to unknown persons, it is important that per-
sonal messages be encrypted. Similarly, because ad-
dresses are chosen independently by each device, the
address offers is no guarantee that a message purporting
to be from a friend is indeed from that friend. Instead,
messages are authenticated by digital signatures.
Based on these principles, we have designed and built
a prototype networking system called AllNet.
A crucial part of AllNet is the management of public
keys. The most straightforward means of securely ex-
changing public keys is for two people to be operating
their mobile devices within range of each other. One
mobile devices will give a brief string to its user, who
communicates it to the other person, who enters it into
their own mobile devices. Once both devices share the
same secret string, they can exchange their public keys
together with an HMAC that proves that each knows
the secret string [1].
With knowledge of all contacts’ public keys, a device
receiving a message carrying its own address can verify
that it comes from a known contact, and only then de-
crypt it. Signature verification is relatively quick [2], so
a mobile device can efficiently discard messages carrying
its address, but not sent by a known contact.
Given that addresses are not required for correct de-
livery, it is worth pondering whether addresses are nec-
essary at all. Consider that:
• mobile devices do not benefit from addresses that
are determined by their position in the network
topology, as that position is likely to change over
time. As a result, there needs to be a way for
messages to reach the destination device no mat-
ter where in the network that device may be con-
nected.
• including addresses in messages makes it easier for
an attacker to do traffic analysis.
• If a device is not connected to the Internet, and
all data communication is via ad-hoc1 or delay-
tolerant2 networks, then addresses seem even more
superfluous. Data in such networks can be broad-
cast to all devices, as long as the network is suffi-
ciently small and the traffic sufficiently low.
After considering current schemes for mobile device
addressing in Section 2 and describing the addressing
scheme of AllNet in Section 3, in Section 4 we look
at each of these three disadvantages of addressing in
mobile networks, and we point out the strengths of
self-selected, position-independent addresses. Section 5
then considers the many uses to which self-selected ad-
dresses can be put.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Mobile IP
IP addresses contain a network part, zero or more
subnetwork parts, and a host part. This hierarchical
arrangement is ideal for minimizing the size of routing
tables in the core of the Internet. Minimizing routing
table size has the direct benefit of lessening the data
structure to search through when forwarding a packet,
and also reduces the amount of information that must
be exchanged to maintain the routing tables. Packets
are forwarded to networks, then within networks to sub-
nets, and in the final network, forwarded based on the
entire IP address.
The main limitation of hierarchical point-of-attachment
addresses is that when the point of attachment to the
network changes, the address must also change. This
has been recognized since the work on Mobile IP [8]
[9] [10]. In Mobile IP, a “mobile node is also associ-
ated with a care-of address, which provides informa-
tion about its current point of attachment to the In-
ternet.” [9]. IP datagrams are routed to the destination
1In an ad-hoc network, messages are forwarded by inter-
mediate devices who happen to be between a source and
destination, no matter what the main functionality of the
device is.
2In a delay-tolerant network, messages are carried by the
physical motion of devices on which the messages are cached,
and delivered when the destination device is in range.
network, where the home agent forwards the datagrams
to the destination through an IP tunnel.
The collection of the home agents provides a global
distributed database mapping each mobile node’s per-
manent address to its current point of attachment ad-
dress.
2.2 Mobile Telephony
Mobile devices using mobile telephony (and mobile
data) protocols have to announce their presence at their
current location. Similar to Mobile IP, this announce-
ment updates the Home Location Register at the cell-
phone’s home location. This Home Location Register is
then used to route incoming calls [7].
As an optimization, the mobile device’s location is
usually cached in the Mobile Switching Center’s Visitor
Location Register of its current location.
The collection of strategies used for mobile telephony
optimizes call routing for mobile devices that are in
their home location, or at least haven’t moved recently.
When these optimization mechanisms do not deliver,
however, the call is ultimately routed based on infor-
mation stored in the Home Location Register.
The collection of Home Location Registers across the
world essentially provides a global distributed database
mapping each mobile node’s permanent address to its
current point of attachment address.
2.3 Global Database of Locations
Any mobile system is likely to have some similari-
ties to both mobile IP and mobile telephony. As we
have seen, except in small networks where broadcasting
can be useful, mobility requires a global database that
tracks the location of mobile devices. The mobile de-
vice address is then an index into the database. Calls
or datagrams are forwarded based on the database con-
tents.
It seems reasonable to state that a fixed hierarchical
address cannot possibly consistently indicate the chang-
ing location of a mobile device, and that some sort of
database is required to support mobility.
In such a database, an address is an indication of
where to locate the correct database entry rather than
an indication of the location of the mobile device.
With the way Mobile IP and Mobile Telephony databases
are distributed, the IP address or mobile telephone num-
ber does loosely indicate which server contains the de-
sired translation. However, this is a matter of man-
agement rather than technology: both Mobile IP and
Mobile Telephony assume a hierarchical address assign-
ment in which addresses are received from a central au-
thority, perhaps through intermediate providers. Al-
ternative technologies, such as Distributed Hash Ta-
bles [11, 13, 12, 15], can provide distributed mappings
for arbitrary addresses that are not assigned hierarchi-
cally.
Similar to Mobile IP and Mobile Telephony, AllNet
uses the destination address to identify the destination
of a message but not the location or point of attachment
of the destination. Unlike these systems, AllNet allows
devices to select their own address. In AllNet, addresses
need not be unique, since AllNet uses encryption to
identify messages sent to or from a specific device.
2.4 Secure Networks
Revelations of message interceptions by governments
and large corporations have prompted the recent devel-
opment of secure communication systems. Older secure
communication systems have sprung from the awareness
of the vulnerability to interception of normal means of
communications, including particularly electronic mail.
Systems such as PGP [16] and TOR [6] have been
set up so individuals can attempt to communicate se-
curely. However, the onus is generally on the individual
to do what is necessary to preserve security. Technically
unsophisticated users, and sometimes even technically
sophisticated users, may employ these systems yet still
inadvertently leak information that is intended to be
kept confidential.
The remainder of this section describes in some detail
two systems, one recent and one older, that are designed
to provide secure communications even to relatively un-
sophisticated users.
2.4.1 BitMessage
The core philosophy of BitMessage is to securely en-
crypt every message, then broadcast it to all, or a subset
of, nodes in the BitMessage network [14].
Like AllNet, BitMessage relies on encryption to de-
termine whether a message is intended for a particular
mobile device. Unlike AllNet, BitMessage supports no
data destination addresses at all. This, together with
the broadcast mechanism, causes foreseeable problems
as the BitMessage network grows. To accomodate such
growth, BitMessage uses a number of mechanisms:
• Proof of work: like Bitcoin, BitMessage requires
that messages sent through the network carry a
proof of work. This lessens the number of messages
that can be sent on the network.
• Each node in the BitMessage network only keeps
and forwards messages that are less than 3 days
old.
• As traffic grows, it can be split into separate streams,
and messages are only broadcast to nodes within
a stream.
Like AllNet, BitMessage relies on key hashes to iden-
tify users that one wishes to communicate with. A
mechanism for exchanging keys lets the hash be used
to verify that indeed this is the individual one wishes to
communicate with. BitMessage calls these hashes “ad-
dresses”, since BitMessage has no message destination
addresses as such. The partitioning of destinations is
reserved for streams, which are only used to reduce the
amount of messages that a server must cache.
Addresses in AllNet are used for message routing, in
the same way that streams are used for BitMessage, but
with the assumption that broadcast is used as a backup
communication mechanism rather than the principal
way of distributing data.
AllNet also supports AllNet Human Readable Ad-
dresses (AHRAs), which are essentially hashes of pub-
lic keys. Once the AHRA is known, a key request can
provide the matching key (non-matching keys are ig-
nored) so secure communication can be provided in one
direction.
AHRAs are described in Section 5.2.
2.4.2 Freenet
Like BitMessage, the purpose of Freenet is to anony-
mously and securely distribute information [4]. Unlike
BitMessage, Freenet is intended to securely distribute
content rather than interpersonal messages. Freenet is
a well-known, mature and yet still evolving project.
Similarities between Freenet and AllNet include the
technical anonymity of participants3 and the pervasive
use of encryption to maintain this anonymity. The use
of hashes to identify entities of interest is also similar,
as is the strategy of moving content closer to its desti-
nation.
Freenet has also been moving closer to the AllNet
strategy of establishing connections primarily among
people already known to each other. This network is
only accessible to people who have a personal connec-
tion to someone already in the network, and is thus
known as the Darknet, as opposed to the regular Freenet
which is available to anyone.
Even with these similarities, there are many differ-
ences between AllNet and Freenet. Primarily, Freenet
is for content distribution, whereas AllNet is intended to
be general purpose, while designed specifically to sup-
port secure interpersonal communication.
3. ALLNET ADDRESS DESIGN
3.1 AllNet Overview
AllNet is a protocol designed primarily to support
secure interpersonal communication among people who
already know each other, but also useful for other forms
of secure communication.
AllNet relies on two main underlying means of com-
munication: the Internet, and direct ad-hoc and delay-
3The technology provides anonymity only as long as the
participants don’t distribute self-identifying information.
tolerant networking between mobile devices. Each of
these is used as available.
Secure key exchange is provided either through direct
communication among mobile devices in close proxim-
ity, or by the authenticated exchange of Allnet Human
Readable Addresses (AHRAs). The first mechanism re-
quires users to enter a short string, to prevent spoofing
by other nearby devices. The second mechanism lever-
ages any authenticated (not necessarily encrypted – for
example, a telephone conversation or a business card)
side channel to exchange AHRAs, which then provide
assurance that the key exchange matches the party pro-
viding the AHRA.
Unlike the proof-of-work mechanism of BitMessage,
AllNet devices accept all messages they receive. Be-
cause a device may receive more messages than it is
willing or able to forward and cache, each device has an
automatic prioritization mechanism based on informa-
tion available in each message. The prioritization may
be changed by each device as appropriate, but by de-
fault gives priority to messages recognizably to or from
friends, and to a lesser extent, to messages that will
consume the least device and network resources.
Within ad-hoc and delay-tolerant networks of mobile
devices forwarding and sometimes physically carrying
messages, messages are essentially broadcast. At any
give time, the highest priority messages are forwarded.
One of the goals of AllNet is to forward messages for
unknown people using at most a small fraction of avail-
able resources, typically 1%. Given the priority and
resource limitations, broadcast should deliver messages
whenever allowed by the resource constraints.
When forwarding data on the Internet, AllNet sends
messages to any IP address it has that identifies the
destination. This includes the destination itself, any
designated Rendezvous Point (RP), and nodes in the
AllNet Distributed Hash Table (DHT). Again, only the
highest priority messages are forwarded, but this may
include all packets if traffic is low.
AllNet messages may be acknowledged. When an ac-
knowledgement is requested, the sender includes in each
message a 16-byte random string called the message
ACK. If the message is encrypted, the message ACK is
encrypted along with the message itself, and the sender
also includes in the message the first 16 bytes of the un-
encrypted hash of the message ACK. This hash is called
the message ID. Only the intended recipient will be able
to decrypt the message and recover the message ACK.
When the recipient returns this ACK to the sender, ev-
ery other node can hash the ACK and, if it corresponds
to the message ID of a previously seen message, delete
the corresponding message from its cache.
AllNet is used primarily for interpersonal communi-
cation, so AllNet maintains a list of contacts and the
public key for each contact. That is, each user’s social
network is kept only on the user’s device, with enough
information to allow secure and authenticated commu-
nication with each person in the social network.
Additional details about AllNet are available from
prior papers [3, 1, 17].
3.2 AllNet Addresses
Section 2 explained some of the ways in which AllNet
addresses resemble and differ from addresses used in
other networks. Like some other networks, AllNet has
two kinds of addresses: addresses used for data routing
and delivery, and AllNet Human Readable Addresses,
or AHRAs. The latter combine some of the properties of
Domain Names with the hashes used in BitMessages to
provide both human-readable and memorable address-
ing and a degree of security. AHRAs are described in
Section 5.2. This section describes the AllNet addresses
used in data delivery.
This explanation of the design of AllNet addresses
begins by describing a simplified version of AllNet that
is a pure broadcast network. In this simplified net-
work, every participating node receives every message,
and no addresses are used. Since most AllNet messages
are signed and encrypted4, every receiver of a message
checks to see if the message is signed by a sender known
from the social network. In the absence of addresses,
this can be done only by trying to verify the signature
with the public key of every contact in the social net-
work. If one of these verifications succeeds, then the
receiver attempts to decrypt the message. If the de-
cryption succeeds, then with overwhelming likelihood,
the message was encrypted with this receiver’s public
key. Therefore, in theory AllNet can be used even with-
out addresses.
Since message addresses can be used by an attacker
for Traffic Analysis, sending and receiving without ad-
dresses is supported by AllNet. Each packet carries
both a 64-bit sending and receiving address, and also
the number of bits of each address that are meaningful.
If the number of bits (of either source or destination ad-
dress, or both) is set to zero, then that address cannot
be used for Traffic Analysis.
Messages with no addresses can be useful on rela-
tively small networks or where security is sufficiently
important that traffic analysis should be thwarted and
the overhead of verifying all the signatures in the social
network is acceptable. However, this is not practical
on most mobile devices, which are resource constrained
and where the threat of traffic analysis is not substan-
tial. So most AllNet messages carry a number of address
bits > 0, currently typically 8 bits.
As well as storing the public key, AllNet stores a lo-
cal and remote address for each contact. The number
4AllNet also supports broadcast messages, which are signed
but not encrypted.
of bits in the address is decided independently by each
peer. When peers exchange messages, they may spec-
ify any number of bits. A source or destination address
matches the remote or local address for a peer when the
number of matching bits is at least the number of bits
specified in the packet, or at least the number specified
in the original exchange. For example, if Alice gives to
Bob an 8-bit address, and Bob gives to Alice a 16-bit ad-
dress, then Bob may attempt to verify and decrypt any
packet with s source bits and d destination bits as long
as the first min(s, 8) bits of the source address match
Alice’s address, and the first min(d, 16) bits of the des-
tination address match the address that Bob gave to
Alice.
This flexibility means each communication can be
configured to trade off power consumption with secu-
rity. When more address bits are specified, each de-
vice needs to verify and decrypt fewer packets, which
can be important for low-power energy-constrained de-
vices. With fewer bits, more verifications and decryp-
tions must be carried out to find out which the packets
are meaningful to a particular user. When resources are
limited and traffic is high, a device may only verify and
decrypt packets with at least a given number of address
bits.
In practice, the current version of AllNet (3.0) always
exchanges 16-bit addresses, and sends 8-bit addresses.
Even with a relatively large network, 8-bit source and
destination addresses mean that typically 28 < 1% of
the public keys in a user’s social network will be tried
for any received packet. The 16-bit address exchange
allows for longer addresses and better filtering to be
used in the future.
Because the bit pattern in the address is not mean-
ingful to AllNet, each device can select any suitable ad-
dress, without coordinating with any central authority
or even a group consensus. Instead, each device can
get online without prior authorization, and may even
choose different addresses for communication with dif-
ferent peers.
The ability to self-select an address fits well with the
AllNet emphasis on distributed communication where
each device is an equal peer, and with enabling com-
munication whenever each device can possibly commu-
nicate, without waiting for registration or approval.
Whenever addresses are self-selected, there is the pos-
sibility that two systems will select the same address.
However, as illustrated by the simplified example of All-
Net using no addresses, duplicate addresses only require
additional verification or decryption attempts, and do
not lead to incorrect behavior.
AllNet addresses can be selected at random, and ran-
dom addresses are perfectly reasonable for security. On
the other hand, many individuals would want an ad-
dress that is memorable and can easily be communi-
cated to others. In this case, the actual AllNet address
can be the hash of a self-selected Personal Name or PN.
Such a personal name can range from a simple name
such as ”Alice”, to more precise names such as ”Acme
Software Co., Peoria”. Either of these will hash to a
seemingly random bitstring, the first few bits of which
can be used as the local address.
To minimize the effect of mis-spellings and confusing
fonts, each letter is mapped to 4 bits, and multiple,
sometimes indistinguishable letters are mapped to the
same pattern. For example, the letters “1”, “l”, “L”, “i”,
and “I” are all mapped to the same bit pattern 0001.
3.3 Forwarding and Routing
In the hypothetical simplified AllNet described above,
all messages were broadcast to all devices. This is effec-
tive in smaller networks, for example when sending data
in an ad-hoc or delay-tolerant fashion directly between
mobile devices. However, broadcast does not scale to
larger networks. When AllNet devices are connected
to the Internet, they also forward data using two well-
established mechanisms, Rendezvous Points and Dis-
tributed Hash Tables.
An AllNet Rendezvous Point (RP) is a device reach-
able at a known IP address, which is willing to ac-
cept and relay messages to and from other AllNet de-
vices. The RP may be open, accepting arbitrary AllNet
data, or may be closed, only accepting data signed with
known keys. This distinction is similar to the Open-
net and Darknet versions of Freenet. With either kind
of RP, the sender sends data to the RP, which caches it
and forwards it to any other AllNet nodes that have reg-
istered as listeners. At a later time, another device may
send a data request to the the RP, specifying what ad-
dresses it is interested in receiving. In response, the RP
returns any cached messages that match the receiver’s
specifications.
The cache is maintained in priority order, using any
priority scheme acceptable to the manager of the RP, or
the default AllNet priority if no other priority has been
specified. In addition, an RP will typically delete from
its cache any message that has been acknowledged by
the receiver, as described in Section 3.1.
Although RPs can be very useful, they must either
be set up individually, or an AllNet user must select
a public RP, which may well be oversubscribed to the
point of deleting useful data before it is forwarded. So
as well as RPs, AllNet supports Distributed Hash Ta-
bles, or DHTs, which can scale to large sizes and still
distribute load reasonably well.
The design of the AllNet DHT is conventional. All-
Net nodes individually decide to become DHT nodes if
they have sufficient resources, including an IP address
that can be used to reach them (i.e. not behind a NAT).
The address space is 64 bits, which matches the AllNet
address space. Each node selects its own 64-bit identi-
fier – in case of collision, all nodes with the same address
store the same messages. Ideally, each AllNet message
is cached in at least the 4 DHT nodes preceding the
destination address of the message.
What is less conventional about the AllNet DHT is
that it supports partially specified addresses, that is,
AllNet addresses with fewer than 64 bits. When the
DHT is small, the first few bits of the address are suffi-
cient to identify which DHT nodes might hold messages
for a given address. As the DHT grows, increasingly
more bits are needed. If a message address has too few
bits to distinguish a target DHT node from its neigh-
bors, the DHT node will cache it with lowered proba-
bility.
As a specific example, consider a message for des-
tination 1011..., which only specifies four bits. Ide-
ally, the message would be stored in all the DHT nodes
responsible for addresses 1011 0000 0000... through
1011 1111 1111.... Since the goal is to store the mes-
sage in at least four nodes, each DHT node keeps track
of how many DHT nodes match each prefix of its iden-
tifier. If an address matches n > 4 DHT nodes, each of
the matching DHT nodes saves the message with prob-
ability 4/n. The receiver will find this message after
querying n/4 DHT nodes on average.
An AllNet device can retrieve its messages from the
DHT in a manner analogous to retrieving messages saved
in an RP, once the DHT node(s) likely to hold its mes-
sages have been identified.
4. ADVANTAGES OF ALLNET ADDRESS-
ING
Since AllNet addresses are self-selected,
1. they have no relation to the device’s point of at-
tachment, so they need not change when the mo-
bile device actually moves
2. being self-selected, they never need to change un-
less the device’s owner wishes to change them, and
3. the AllNet addresses can be chosen to correspond
to meaningful names that are easy to communicate
and remember.
These benefits follow directly from giving the user the
power to select his or her own address, and from AllNet
working well even when addresses are duplicate.
For comparison, BitMessage addresses have the first
two of these benefits but not the last one. Existing
mobile IP and mobile Telephony addresses only provide
the first of these benefits, and even then, only as long
as the address assignment lasts. For mobile Telephony
(and sometimes for Mobile IP) this requires a financial
commitment.
Other advantages of AllNet addresses were mentioned
in Section 3.2. These include the option of masking
most or all of the bits of the address to foil traffic anal-
ysis, and the competing benefit of using addresses help
filter out packets for which verification and decryption
need not be attempted.
When AllNet is used for wireless ad-hoc and delay-
tolerant message transmission, addresses are also useful
to select a priority for outgoing messages. Since wireless
spectrum is sometimes a valuable commodity, and in
any case using onboard radios consumes energy, it is
beneficial to prioritize the transmission of packets that
are of use to the recipient. In the handshake at the
beginning of an AllNet ad-hoc exchange, receivers may
indicate addresses they are particularly interested in,
and senders may prioritize such messages.
5. USING ALLNET ADDRESSES
5.1 Multiple Addresses per Device
One further benefit of having self-selected addresses
is the ease with which one may select multiple addresses
to be used in different circumstances. It it is easy to use
a different destination address for every contact in the
social network, for example.
IPv6 [5] has already introduced the world to the no-
tion that it is reasonable to assign different IP addresses
to a single interface. With a device having multiple ad-
dresses, receiving is relatively easy – the device simply
receives any message for which the destination address
matches any one of its addresses. Sending requires that
one of the available addresses be selected as the source
address for outgoing messages, and so rules are needed
to select one address over the other addresses.
For AllNet, the rule is relatively simple. The public
IP address is only used as a source address if there is
no shared key with the destination (if there are multi-
ple public IP addresses, then the user can select one).
Whenever keys are exchanged as part of the initial hand-
shake in any private communication, randomly-selected
addresses valid only for this social connection are ex-
changed as well. Then, each local address is associated
with a specific remote address, local and remote public
keys, and local secret key, and all communication can
use these specific addresses.
5.2 AllNet Human-Readable Addresses
Section 2 introduced the notion of AllNet Human-
Readable Addresses, or AHRAs. Unlike regular AllNet
addresses, AHRAs are designed specifically to exchange
among humans, in a way analogous to current email
addresses, but hopefully more easily remembered. This
section describes AHRAs in detail.
The basic format of an AHRA resembles an email
address:
personal_name@word_pair.word_pair
The personal name (PN) is the one of the public ad-
dresses for this individual. An address including only
the PN (name@) is valid, but may not be unique.
The word pairs (WPs) are a way of encoding a hash
of the public key stored in the device in a memorable
way. Each word pair encodes 14 bits of the hash, with
successive pairs encoding successive bits. The 14 bits
are encoded as two seven-bit parts, each taken from a
dictionary of 128 common words. For example, in En-
glish, the first few words in the dictionary used for the
first part of a word pair includes the words “the”, “be”,
“of”, “to”, “a”, and so on. The dictionary for the second
word in the pairs includes the words “time”, “people”,
“year”, “well”, “work”, and so on. Word pairs might then
be “of-time”, “to-work”, and so on.
When a user wishes to create an AllNet address, the
user puts his or her device to work creating keys. Keys
must have certain properties (described in the next para-
graph), so in general a large number of public/secret key
pairs must be generated. All the keys that satisfy the
properties needed of an AHRA are recorded and saved
for the user’s perusal. The user then gets to choose
which of these keys the user prefers. For example, All-
Net has a time server that sends a time message once
an hour. The AHRA for this time server is allnet-
hourly-time-server@if-wish.think-past.get-future.
This was one of many AHRAs generated for the PN
“allnet-hourly-time-server”, and was selected by the au-
thor who believes these word pairs are memorable in
the context of this PN.
The property that makes a public key valid for use
in an AHRA is that the cyphertext from encrypting
the PN with the public key must contain a minimum
of n 16-bit strings taken sequentially from the hash of
the PN.
For example, consider a PN that hashes to a value
ending5 with (hex) 5518 22B5 5D7C . Then, if n = 3,
the only acceptable public keys for this PN are those
where the PN, when encrypted with the key, contains
all of the 16-bit strings 5518, 22B5, and 5D7C. If n = 2,
only the last two are required.
Assuming that the PN, when encrypted using the
public key, is no longer than 214 = 16, 384 bits, then
only 14 bits are needed to encode the position of each
of the bit strings found. These positions are what is
encoded in the word pairs.
With this scheme,
• verifying that a public key matches a given AHRA
is very fast, requiring only an encryption and a few
lookups
• generating a key given a personal name (PN) is
5The beginning of the hash is used as the local address, so
the bit strings are taken from the end of the hash.
somewhat slower, but still
• is much faster than generating a key to match a
complete AHRA
To see that the last is true, consider that in generat-
ing a key, approximately (2b/l)
n
keys must be examined
to find one with n matches of the last b-bit (in AllNet,
b = 16) strings of the hash of the PN, given that the
encrypted PN has l bits. Conversely, given an AHRA
with n word pairs, approximately 2bn keys must be ex-
amined to find a match. The ratio of the work needed
to steal a key to the work needed to generate a key is
then ln.
For an l = 4, 096-bit encrypted PN, the attacker must
then do over 4,000 times more work than the generator
for each word pair in the AHRA. With just 3 word
pairs, the attacker must search 68, 719, 476, 736 more
keys than the generator to find a match. This is assum-
ing that:
• the public key encryption is independent from hash-
ing, so that the likelihood of finding the bit strings
of the hash in the ciphertext is effectively random
• exhaustive search is the most effective way for an
attacker to build a public key matching a given
AHRA
An AHRA with n word pairs can always be given
to somebody with only the first m < n word pairs.
This lessens security, but makes the AHRA easier to
communicate and remember. In the example of the
hourly time server, it would be sufficient to rememeber
allnet-hourly-time-server@if-wish. There is thus
no penalty to choosing an AHRA with a large number
n of word pairs, providing security only when desired.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
We have shown that in mobile systems the address
space is essentially flat, and reliance on a global transla-
tion database is a necessary part of any mobile system.
This database may be distributed, and the address is
used as an index into the database.
The design of AllNet takes advantage of this design
requirement to dispense with the need for addresses to
be assigned hierarchically. Since AllNet already pro-
vides encryption and authentication, these are lever-
aged to support non-unique addresses. Addresses can
then be self-selected, and used both as an optimization
to avoid having to verify and decrypt every message,
and as a key for locating messages in a distributed hash
table.
Self-selected, not globally unique addresses may be
chosen to represent a meaningful name without the con-
tortions needed in systems requiring globally unique
names. The AllNet Human-Readable Addresses com-
bine personal names with sets of word pairs identifying
public keys.
6.2 Implementation and Future Work
Everything described here has been implemented in
AllNet version 3 [17], with the exception of the the
Distributed Hash Tables, for which implementation is
ongoing (the current implementation relies on a single
server as a Rendezvous Point, which is effective as long
as traffic is light and the server is reliable). The wireless
ad-hoc portion of AllNet, which has not been empha-
sized in this paper, is also still being improved. Efforts
are underway to port the original Linux implementation
of AllNet to other platforms, initially Android, but also
foreseeably IOS and Windows.
Many improvements are possible, but further expe-
rience with the current system will guide priorities for
the near future.
One theoretically interesting issue is how to use ad-
dresses while defeating traffic analysis. For example,
two peers might agree to change their address after ev-
ery message. The function to change the address would
be known to the peers, but not to outsiders – for ex-
ample, the HMAC of the current address with a se-
cret string only known only to the peers. Then, a peer
would check the hash table locations corresponding to
the next address in the sequence. This is more efficient
than sending messages to addresses with few or no bits.
An attacker eavesdropping on a given device would be
able to tell that messages have been sent or received,
but have no indication of who the message was from.
An attacker eavesdropping on AllNet messages but with
no indication of which device had sent or received the
message, would have no information whatsoever.
6.3 Conclusion
Hierarchically assigned point-of-attachment globally
unique addresses have been and continue to be amaz-
ingly useful, and indeed the current Internet would be
unimaginable without them. However, these addresses
simply don’t work well for mobile nodes. Either the
mobile node must change address every time its point
of attachment to the network changes, or the address
cannot identify the point of attachment.
This limitation, while it requires redirection and up-
dating of the mobile database whenever the mobile node
moves, is also liberating, providing opportunities to choose
meaningful and memorable addresses that reflect a per-
son’s preference rather than the person’s or device’s po-
sition in a hierarchy.
These opportunities extend to the technical side of
addressing. Since an intermediary is required to locate
mobile nodes, AllNet uses this intermediary as a Ren-
dezvous Point, usually a node in the Distributed Hash
Table, to cache and forward messages. This is analo-
gous to an email server, which can be contacted at a
known location by both the sender and the receiver of
the email, and stores email until deleted by the receiver.
The indirection required to support mobility can be
an opportunity for new designs. We have presented the
design choices for AllNet, but many other choices are
possible, and we hope this paper inspires others to take
advantage of this new freedom.
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